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Note
Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation
John Dragseth
Accused patent infringers often face the threat of multi-mil-
lion dollar damage awards. If a court finds an accused infringer
guilty of "willfully" infringing a patent, the infringer may face a
statutory trebling of damages1 which could push the total dam-
age award into the hundreds-of-millions of dollars.2 An accused
infringer frequently must seek an opinion of counsel describing
why the asserted patent is invalid or why it does not infringe the
patent. The accused infringer may rely on this opinion to rebut
allegations of willful infringement.3 Consequently, the accused
infringer may introduce the opinion at trial, asserting that it did
not infringe the patent willfully because it relied in good faith on
the letter's pronouncement of innocence. Unfortunately, in pro-
ducing such an opinion, the accused infringer must often waive
its attorney-client privilege. If the accused infringer refuses to
1. Section 284 of the Patent Act authorizes the district courts to increase
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed. 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1988). The potential for statutory trebling can thus become the focus of the
defense's attention during litigation. See Richard B. Racine & Michele C.
Bosch, Willful Infringement: A Real Concern, 3 FED. CiRcurr B.J. 409, 409
(1993) ("Unless the defendant has an airtight defense to willful infringement,
its cloud envelopes the lawsuit, often influencing trial strategy every step of the
way.").
2. A recent study of patent cases from 1982-1994 found that, of 177 cases
awarding damages, 61 resulted in damages between $1 million and $10 million
and 25 resulted in damages over $10 million. See Julie L. Davis & Allison C.
Moran, An Historical Look at Patent Infringement Damage Awards, in INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES 3, 6 (Supp. 1995); see also Minne-
sota Mining and AMfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming an award of more than $106 million);
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1541 (D.
Mass. 1990) (awarding more than $900 million); cf Litton Indus. Inc. v. Honey-
well Inc., No. 90-4823, 1995 WL 366468, at *56 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1995) (grant-
ing defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and vacating
$1.2 billion jury verdict).
3. See infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal
Circuit's review of the attorney's opinion letter).
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produce the opinion letter when requested by the opposing party
and, instead, asserts the attorney-client privilege, 4  the
factfinder may infer either that the opinion was unfavorable or
that the accused infringer did not obtain an opinion.5 Such an
inference (hereinafter "the inference") tends to disregard the ac-
cused infringer's reasons for protecting the opinion.6
The inference presents an accused patent infringer with a
harsh dilemma: present the opinion and waive the attorney-cli-
ent privilege or assert the privilege and risk having the court
infer that the opinion was unfavorable.7 While the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit ("the Federal Circuit") has recog-
nized the problems caused by this inference,8 it has failed to
craft a doctrine which will guide and control the district courts.
District courts continue to act unpredictably, and the attorney-
client relationship suffers as a result. Clients spend thousands
of dollars9 on showpiece opinion letters which proclaim their in-
nocence but fail to provide the sort of unbiased advice on which
to base an intelligent business decision.10 In light of the impor-
tance of the willfulness determination in patent cases1 1 and re-
cent pronouncements by the Federal Circuit,1 2 it is time for the
4. See infra Part I.B. (reviewing the bases of the attorney-client privilege
and its treatment by the Federal Circuit).
5. See infra Part I.C. (describing the cases in which the Federal Circuit
first allowed such an inference).
6. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text (describing legitimate
reasons an accused infringer may have for refusing to produce an opinion
letter).
7. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text (citing articles critical
of the Federal Circuit's inference because of the dilemma it produces).
8. See infra notes 116-118 (describing recent cases in which the Federal
Circuit has resisted strict application of the inference).
9. Opinions can range in cost from $10,000 for a simple opinion to $30,000
or more for a complex multi-issue opinion. Telephone Interview with Mary
Bauman, Assistant General Counsel, Patents, Sanofi, Inc. (Aug. 14, 1995).
10. See infra notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text (describing the type
of opinion letter typically supplied to a client under the current system).
11. In 1986, the Federal Circuit analyzed the issue of willful infringement
at least 12 times, making it the most frequently discussed topic related to dam-
ages. Douglas A. Strawbridge et al., Patent Law Developments in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. Rnv.
861, 891-92 (1987). Willful infringement continues frequently to confront the
Federal Circuit. See PATRICIA N. BRANTLEY, PATENT LAw HANDBOOK 161-76
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1993-94) (discussing five willful infringement cases decided
by the Federal Circuit in 1992).
12. The Federal Circuit recently revisited the inference and limited its ap-
plication. See Electro Medical Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d
1048, 1056-57 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the accused infringer's assertion of
the attorney-client privilege did not establish an irrebuttable presumption of
willfulness); Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643-44 (Fed. Cir.
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Federal Circuit to lay out a willful infringement framework for
the district courts. 13
This Note contends that the inference has caused many
problems in the way patent attorneys practice law, while result-
ing in little practical benefit for, or effect on, determinations of
willful patent infringement. Part I of the Note surveys the his-
tory of the attorney-client privilege and reviews the develop-
ment of the willful infringement analysis in the federal courts
through the Federal Circuit's creation of the inference. Part 1[[
questions the doctrinal justification for the inference and asserts
that the damage to the attorney-client privilege caused by fear
of the inference greatly outweighs any promotion of fairness un-
derlying the inference. Part HI proposes that the Federal Cir-
cuit repudiate the inference in certain situations and allow the
accused infringer a choice: introduce the opinion letter as evi-
dence to disprove willfulness or hold the letter and rely on other
evidence to rebut the plaintiff's evidence of willfulness. 14 This
1991) (suggesting that courts give "serious consideration" to separate trials on
liability and willfulness). These cases are discussed infra Part D.D.
13. Doctrinal uncertainty persists despite extensive review by commenta-
tors of the Federal Circuit's holdings in willful infringement cases. See gener-
ally, Lester L. Hewitt & E. Randall Smith, The Effect of Ten Years of Federal
Circuit Law on: Willful Infringement and Increased Damages, 36 IDEA 37
(1994) (describing the historical development of the Federal Circuit's willfil-
ness doctrine); Laurence H. Pretty, Where the Veil Against Discovery in Patent
Litigation Falls, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 71 (1994) (describing the
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in patent litigation); George M. Sirilla et
al., The Advice of Counsel Defense to Increased Patent Damages, 62 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 705, 709-16 (1992) (reviewing the history of the advice
of counsel defense to trebled patent damages); Timothy N. Trop, Negative Infer-
ences From the Absence of Attorney Testimony in Patent Cases, 15 AIPLA Q.J.
50-56 (1987) (describing the negative inference applied by the Federal Circuit);
Timothy N. Trop, The Evolution of the Totality of the Circumstances Test for
Willful Infringement, 27 IDEA 241 (1986) (describing the Federal Circuit's
caselaw on factors determining willfulness).
14. Some commentators have suggested more extensive revisions of the
law surrounding negative inferences drawn from the failure to produce an opin-
ion of counsel. See, e.g., Mark A. Flagel & Rachel Terner, An Accused Patent
Infringer's Dilemma: Waive the Attorney-Client Privilege, or Risk a Finding of
Willful Infringement, 11 CompuTER LAw 20 (1994) (suggesting separate opinion
counsel and litigation counsel, with litigation counsel proffering no opinions on
validity or infringement, and waiver extending only to communications with
opinion counsel); David A. Nelson, Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege and Pro-
cedural Safeguards: Are They Worth the Costs?, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 368, 383-415
(1992) (arguing that the Federal Circuit's inference violates the accused
infringer's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, fifth amendment
due process rights, seventh amendment right to a trial by jury, and sixth
amendment right to effective counsel); see also infra note 121 and accompany-
ing text (describing ABA Section of Intellectual Property resolution advocating
1995]
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Note concludes that, absent modification by the Federal Circuit,
the negative inference will continue to frustrate the accused
infringer's ability to obtain candid advice from counsel.
I. WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT AND THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: A REVIEW
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, granting it exclusive jurisdiction over patent ap-
peals.15 Since the Federal Circuit's inception, both the volume
of patent litigation and the size of patent awards have increased
greatly.16 The Federal Circuit has used its exclusive authority
a rule requiring bifurcation of the willfulness determination from the issue of
liability in all patent cases tried to a jury). While this Note does not critique
these proposals, the author believes that a more conservative approach best
achieves the objectives of judicial restraint and easy implementation. Other
commentators have criticized the affirmative duty placed on accused infringers.
See, e.g., Breton A. Bocchieri, The Trap of Willful Patent Infingement: A Corpo-
rate Dilemma, 29 IDEA 105, 108-10 (1988). The author believes the duty of due
care is a workable requirement if the courts do not threaten the accused
infringer with a negative inference.
15. The United States Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. With the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in
various sections of 28 U.S.C.), Congress granted the Federal Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction "of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
States ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on
section 1338 [of title 281." 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988). Section 1338(a) grants
the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over "any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents." Id. § 1338(a).
Congress formed the Federal Circuit by merging the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims. See South Corp. v. United States, 690
F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). The Federal Circuit adopted the holdings of
those two predecessor courts. Id. To relieve the load on the other circuit courts
and to promote predictability, uniformity, and the efficient administration of
the patent law, Congress centralized the review of patent decisions in the Fed-
eral Circuit. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, (1982) reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12-13; see also Robert Desmond, Nothing Seems "Obvi-
ous" to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 455,
455-64 (1993) (recounting the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit). The Federal Circuit is the first and only federal circuit court of ap-
peals with nationwide jurisdiction limited only by subject matter. Mark J.
Abate & Edmund J. Fish, Supreme Court Review of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1982-1992, 2 FED. CIRcuiT B.J. 307, 307 (1992).
In addition to its exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the United States dis-
trict courts in patent cases, the Federal Circuit also hears appeals from the
Merit Systems Protection Board and from the United States Claims Court. Id.
16. Nancy J. Linck & Barry P. Golob, Patent Damages: The Basics, 34
IDEA 13, 32 (1993). Between 1981 and 1994, the number of patent cases filed
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over patent appeals to rewrite and unify the federal patent
caselaw during this time.17 In addition, the court has been more
inclined than its predecessor circuit courts to find patents valid
and infringed.' 8
A. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND THE DUTY OF THE ACCUSED
INFRINGER IN PATENT CASES
Under the 1952 Patent Act, the holder of a valid United
States patent may bring a civil action for infringement of the
patent.' 9 A party infringes a patent when, within the United
States, it makes, uses, or sells, without authority, any patented
invention during the term of the patent.20 A court may exercise
its discretion to increase damages for patent infringement up to
three times the amount assessed at trial (i.e., "trebling" of dam-
annually increased from 795 to 1407. Victor G. Savikas and Marsha E. Durko,
Survey of Patent Lawyers Reveals Their Opinions of Judges and Litigation,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 31, 1994, at C38. Between 1991 and 1992 alone, the number of
cases increased 25%. Ludwig E. Kolman & Thomas L. Duston, In Patent Litiga-
tion, Can Teamwork Work?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at S15; see also supra
note 2 (listing several recent large verdicts in patent infringement suits).
17. Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System,
73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 5, 9 (1991). The United States Code, Title
35, codifies patent law. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988). Congress has made no
major changes to the patent laws since overhauling the statute in 1952. Rich-
ard W. Hoffman, What Constitutes a Printed Publication Under the Patent Act,
1988 DET. C.L. REv. 961, 961.
18. A 1990 New York Times Article reported:
[A] recent 1970-1989 survey by the Boston University School of Law
found that the number of reported awards and monetary settlements
increased sharply since the Federal Circuit was set up by Congress in
1982. Awards have climbed from an average of $2 million in the early
1970's to $18 million in each of the last three years.
Edmund L. Andrews, Protecting Microbes and Mathematics: A New Federal Ap-
peals Court is Expanding the Power of Patents, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 1990, Sec.
3, at 12; see also Richard Burke, The Pendulum Swings on Patents, Pnn.6 IN-
QUIER, Mar. 26, 1990, at Cl; Desmond supra note 15, at 460-61 n41 (describ-
ing forum shopping resulting from inconsistencies among the federal circuits
and stating that the Eighth Circuit held invalid every patent it reviewed from
1950 to 1970); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 803, 821 n.65 (1988) (not-
ing that, from 1921 to 1973, the circuit courts held two-thirds of litigated pat-
ents invalid). Even the Supreme Court historically had been openly hostile to
patents. See Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe only patent that is valid is one which this Court
has not been able to get its hands on.").
19. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988). The patentholder may obtain an injunction, re-
cover damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, and recover rea-
sonable attorney's fees in exceptional cases. Id. §§ 283-285.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
1995]
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ages).21 Although the statute contains no specific guidelines for
such trebling of damages, courts have traditionally awarded in-
creased damages only after a finding of willful or bad faith in-
fringement. 22  Under the Federal Circuit's standard, a
patentholder proves willfulness by presenting clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the infringer acted in disregard of the patent
and had no reasonable basis for believing it had a right to en-
gage in the infringing acts.23
21. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). The treble damages provision is a ceiling rather
than an absolute requirement. The Federal Circuit will not disturb a decision
by a district court to award increased damages unless the decision is clearly
erroneous. Electro Medical Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d
1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
22. See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("[T]his court has approved such awards where the infringer acted in wanton
disregard of the patentee's patent rights, that is, where the infringement is will-
ful."); Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Provisions for in-
creased damages . . . are available as deterrents to blatant, blind, willful
infringement of valid patents."); 5 DONALD S. CHIsum, PATENTS § 20.03[4][b](v]
(1994) ("e Federal Circuit's decisions have reinforced the notion that multiple
damages is primarily a punitive provision to deter willful infringement of pat-
ents."). In its first opinion on the subject, the Federal Circuit stated: "[Miore is
necessary to support a finding of 'willfulness' than that the infringing acts were
not inadvertent. The court must determine that the infringer... had no rea-
sonable basis for believing it had a right to do the acts." Stickle v. Heublein,
Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983). A finding of willful infringement
may also serve as a basis for finding that a case is "exceptional," and thus de-
serving of reasonable attorney's fees. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988).
23. Electro Medical, 34 F.3d at 1056; see also Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 829
(reversing a finding of willfulness and finding that "[nlo reasonable juror could
find the asserted proof of willfulness rose to the quantum of clear and convinc-
ing evidence"). The Federal Circuit, however, typically affirms the award of in-
creased damages based on willful infringement. John B. Pegram, Preserving
Privilege in the Face of a Willful Infringement Charge, 73 J. PAT. & TRADE ARK
OFF. Soc'y 286, 287 (1991); see Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Johnson &
Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming a
finding of willful infringement); Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1428
(Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The test is whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable
person would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that a court might
hold the patent invalid or not infringed."); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morri-
son-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming the district
court's finding of willfulness based on the totality of the circumstances under a
clearly erroneous standard). Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, courts
did not find willfulness if either the validity of the patent or infringement by the
defendant was open to an "honest doubt," a standard much more deferential to
the accused infringer. See Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462,474
(10th Cir. 1982) ("An infringer who reasonably doubted that the patent was
valid has not willfully infringed the patent."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982);
Western Elec. Co., Inc. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 631 F.2d 333,337-38 (4th Cir.
1980) (finding the accused infringer's reliance on an opinion of counsel indica-
tive of an honest doubt as to its liability), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981);
172 [Vol. 80:167
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When conducting a willful infringement analysis, the Fed-
eral Circuit reviews an accused infringer's actions under the "to-
tality of the circumstances."24 While the court looks mainly to
whether the accused infringer obtained a competent opinion of
counsel25 when considering the totality of the circumstances, it
also considers a variety of non-opinion factors. These factors in-
clude: evidence of intentional copying of the invention;26
whether the infringer conducted a prior investigation of the
scope of the patent claims;27 whether the patent issued before
the acts of infringement;28 whether the infringer attempted to
conceal its acts;29 whether, and to what extent, the infringer
took remedial actions;30 whether the infringer made a good faith
attempt to "design around" the patented invention;31 whether
the infringer held a good faith basis for believing its acts were
Eltra Corp. v. Basic Inc., 599 F.2d 745, 757 (6th Cir. 1979) ("The existence of
honest doubt concerning the validity of a patent precludes a finding of willful-
ness."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
24. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1559 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
25. See 5 CmsUM, supra note 22, § 20.03[4][b][iv]. For a discussion of
factors used to determine the competency of an opinion letter, see infra notes
46-55 and accompanying text.
26. Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Copying
is the most common reason for a finding of willful infringement. John J.
Pavlak, Willful Patent Infringement, in PATENT LAw ANNUAL § 3.04[2] (1984).
27. Bott, 807 F.2d at 1572.
28. Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508,
510-11 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
29. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
30. Intra Corp. v. Hamar Laser Instruments, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1420, 1439
(E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 320 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1021 (1989).
31. Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 275 (Fed. Cir.
1985). Designing around involves studying the asserted patent, determining its
scope of coverage, and designing a new product specifically to avoid that cover-
age. See Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 82 (6th
Cir. 1971) (stating that the doctrine of "legitimate design around... recognizes
the right of one to look at a patent, make a good faith determination of its scope
of protection and then design a process or product that skirts that protection").
The Federal Circuit also approves of legitimate designing around:
Conduct... involving keeping track of a competitor's products and
designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is
the stuff of which competition is made and is supposed to benefit the
consumer. One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called "nega-
tive incentive" to "design around" a competitor's products, even when
they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the
marketplace. It should not be discouraged by punitive damage awards
except in cases where conduct is so obnoxious as clearly to call for
them.
State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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legitimate;32 the circumstances surrounding license negotia-
tions;33 the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation;34 the
infringer's size and financial condition; 35 and the closeness of
the case on the issues of validity, infringement and
willfulness.3 6
Without reason the Federal Circuit reviews the infringer's
actions under an objective standard in some cases, and under a
subjective standard in others. Because willfulness is a determi-
nation of the infringer's state of mind,37 the court has sometimes
required that the accused infringer knowingly disregard the
patent.38 In many of its decisions, however, the court has
adopted an objective standard for willfulness.3 9 In general, the
court has asked whether the infringer held a good faith belief
32. Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1548
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
33.' See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc.,
774 F.2d 478, 482 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (affirming a jury's willfulness finding where
the infringer refused the patentee's offer of a license, stating "before he would
pay ... a nickel, he'd see [the patentee] in the courthouse").
34. Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 511
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
35. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
36. Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 183
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827; Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group,
Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 918 (1991).
37. E.g., Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 828; see also Thorn EMI North Am., Inc.
v. Micron Technology, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D. Del. 1993) ("Whether an
infringer acted willfully or wantonly is a question of fact that rests on a deter-innation of the infringer's state of mind-"); Union Carbide Corp. v. Tarancon
Corp., 742 F. Supp. 1565, 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1990) ("Whether an act is willful is by
definition a question of the actor's intent.").
38. See Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But
see State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (holding that a party need not have actual knowledge that its acts in-
fringe), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
39. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 594 F. Supp.
1051, 1084 (D. Del. 1984) (holding the infringer had "no reasonable basis" for
believing it had a right to do the acts in question); see also, Donald L. Cox,
Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation, in PATENT LrrIGATIoN 1994, at 569,
585 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. G-397, 1994) ("The Federal Circuit's analysis of the will-
fulness issue is internally inconsistent and leads to results which are at vari-
ance with basic concepts applicable in other tort situations."). After writing
that "M[w]illfulness is a determination as to a state of mind," the Read Corp.
court noted, "[tihis precedent does not mean a client must itself be able to eval-
uate the legal competence of its attorney's advice to avoid a finding of willful-
ness." Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 828-29.
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that it was not liable for infringement, and whether that belief
was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 40
In 1984, the Federal Circuit significantly reduced the plain-
tiff's burden of production in willful infringement disputes by
placing an offsetting duty on the defendant. The court held that
notification by a patent holder of possible infringement places an
affirmative duty on the accused infringer to exercise due care to
determine whether or not it is infringing.41 This duty typically
includes the obligation to seek and obtain competent legal
advice from counsel in the form of a legal opinion before initiat-
ing or continuing any potential infringement. 42 The court, how-
ever, has not always required that an accused infringer obtain
an opinion,43 and the presence of an opinion letter will not auto-
matically relieve a party from a finding of willful infringement.44
While the importance of the opinion does not wholly depend
on its legal correctness, it must be thorough enough, when comb-
ined with the other factors of the "totality of the circumstances"
40. See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862
F.2d 1564, 1577-79 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming a finding of no willfulness where
defendant's reliance on counsel's opinion was reasonable, even though the opin-
ion itself was incorrect).
41. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380,
1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings
Co., 24 F.3d 178, 184-88 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (describing steps the patent holder
must take to satisfy the notice requirement in a willful infringement action).
42. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390. The court affirmed a holding of
willful infringement and treble damages by the district court where it found the
defendant's legal opinion incompetent. Id. The court criticized the opinion on
three grounds: it was prepared by in-house counsel, counsel was not a patent
attorney, and counsel did not review the patent application's prosecution his-
tory. Id.
43. 'The weight that may fairly be placed on the presence or absence of an
exculpatory opinion of counsel has varied with the circumstances of each case,
and has not been amenable to development of a rigorous rule." Rite-Hite Corp.
v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Electro Medical
Sys., SA. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056-57 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding that though the infringer did not obtain an opinion of counsel, its in-
fringement was not willful where it sold only six infringing devices for the sole
purpose of raising the issue for litigation); Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod.
Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming the trial court's denial
of treble damages; although the infringer did not obtain an opinion letter, the
record showed no evidence of copying and the infringer concluded in good faith
that its device did not infringe and mounted a substantial challenge to the
charge of infringement).
44. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schur Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert &
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1084 n.13 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("T]hat an opinion of counsel was obtained does not 'always and alone'
dictate a finding that the infringement was not willful."), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1063 (1988).
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test, to instill a belief in the accused infringer that a court might
reasonably find the patent invalid, not infringed, or unenforce-
able.45 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly looked to the sub-
stance of the opinion of counsel in this regard.46 The opinion
should be that of a patent attorney rather than a general attor-
ney.47 The opinion should be in writing,48 include an analysis
for each claim of the patent at issue,49 and be based on a diligent
search of the prior art50 and a review of the application's prose-
cution history.51 An infringement opinion should include an
45. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
46. See, e.g., Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(affirming a finding of willful infringement where the opinion was from in-
house counsel and "consisted merely of conclusory statements without support-
ing reasons"); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1576-77
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (rejecting the advice of counsel defense because the opinion
letter was equivocal and based solely on file history prior art).
47. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390. A patent attorney is an attor-
ney who has passed the patent bar exam and is licensed to practice before the
Patent and Trademark Office. 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.6-10.8 (1994).
48. See Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopae-
dics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding the opinion inade-
quate where it was an oral opinion received from in-house counsel and based on
information from an individual with a stake in the infringing product).
49. A claim analysis compares each of the elements in a patent claim to the
accused product or process. If the accused product or process contains every
element of any claim in the patent, it infringes the patent. See Lemelson v.
United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is also well settled that
each element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order for a court
to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or
its substantial equivalent in the accused device.").
50. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1546-47 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) ("Counsel expressly stated in the letter that it had reviewed the
patent, its file history, and the pertinent prior art,... as well as certain tests,
experiments, and studies performed in connection with this proceeding.");
Lightwave Technologies, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1838, 1847 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (criticizing opinions which considered only validity,
not infringement, and which "relied heavily upon art previously considered and
rejected by the Patent Office during prosecution"). Prior art includes any prior
knowledge, acts, descriptions and patents relevant to the invention in question.
Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 663 F.2d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 1981). Prior art which
is very similar to the invention claimed in the patent application can render the
claimed invention "non-novel" or obvious, invalidating the patent. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 (1988). A patent applicant has a duty to disclose to the
Patent and Trademark Office any information known to the applicant to be ma-
terial to patentability, including prior art. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1994).
51. A patent application's prosecution history consists of records of the
communications between the patent applicant and the patent examiner at the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. The prosecution history is impor-
tant because statements made by the applicant in the history can work an es-
toppel on the applicant during patent litigation, limiting the scope of the
litigated patent claim. See Lemelson, 752 F.2d at 1550 ("[Tlhe prosecution his-
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analysis of both literal infringement and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 52 More important, the infringer must
supply its counsel with all pertinent facts,53 follow the opinion,54
and not pick and choose from several opinions.55
B. Tm ATTORNEY-CujE'r PRIVILEGE AND rrS WAIVER
Unlike most rules of evidence-which aspire to discern the
truth through disclosure of evidence-the rules of privilege re-
sult in the suppression of the truth.56 The redeeming quality of
a privilege is its protection of relationships or interests that soci-
tory is always relevant to a proper interpretation of a claim."); cf. Central Soya
Co., Inc. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
that attorney's advice, based solely on patent prosecution history prior art, was
not a dispositive showing of the accused infringer's good faith).
52. Literal infringement occurs when the accused product or process em-
bodies all of the limitations listed in a patent claim. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-
Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 961 (1988), and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988). Absent literal infringe-
ment, a product or process may nevertheless infringe a patent under the doc-
trine of equivalents if the accused device or process is not substantially different
from the invention claimed in the patent. Id. at 934. In a recent decision, the
Federal Circuit held that consideration of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is a factual issue rather than an equitable issue. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., No. 93-1088, 1995 WL 468346, at
*7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 8, 1995) (en banc) (per curiam). An equitable issue is thus not
a prerequisite for a doctrine of equivalents inquiry. An analysis under the doc-
trine of equivalents would therefore seem to be an important part of any compe-
tent infringement opinion. But see Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co.,
991 F.2d 735, 744 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he opinion letter contains enough other
indicia of competence that the failure to discuss infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents is not fatal."); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959
F.2d 936, 944-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that where the opinion letter thor-
oughly discussed the reasons for counsel's conclusions, an analysis under the
doctrine of equivalents was not per se necessary to establish the infringer's
claim of a reasonable belief of noninfringement).
53. See Goodwall Constr. Co. v. Beers Constr. Co., 991 F.2d 751, 758 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (rejecting the defense of reliance on advice of counsel where the
infringer attempted to mislead patent counsel in formulating the opinion of in-
fringement); United States Surgical Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Intl PTY. Ltd.,
701 F. Supp. 314, 351 (D. Conn. 1988) (same).
54. Central Soya, 723 F.2d at 1577 ( [Intentional disregard of its counsel's
opinion negates any inference of good faith, placing [the infringer] in the same
position as one who failed to secure the advice of counsel.").
55. Abbott Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832 (N.D.
IlM. 1987). This ruling is consistent with the general policy of subject matter
waiver that fairness requires the opposing party have access to all information
to rebut the asserting party's evidence. See In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103
(2d Cir. 1987) ("Like the 'implied waiver,' the subject matter waiver also rests
on the fairness considerations at work in the context of litigation.").
56. McCoRMcIC ON EVIDENCE § 72 (4th ed. 1992).
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ety values enough to warrant some loss of evidence.5 7 The attor-
ney-client privilege, the oldest of the "communication"
privileges, protects confidential communications between legal
counsel and the client.58 The privilege encourages "full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients" both
for giving professional advice to the client and for giving of infor-
mation to the lawyer.59 Thus, the privilege assures the client
57. Id. Commentators have advanced two principal justifications for the
doctrine of privilege. The utilitarian justification holds that free communica-
tion is essential to relationships, such as attorney-client and physician-patient,
that society values. Id. The more recent non-utilitarian justification bases the
privilege on the need to protect the essential privacy of certain significant
human relationships. Id.
58. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Union Carbide
Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (D. Del. 1985); 8 JoHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961). Many jurisdic-
tions, including the federal tribunals, have codified the doctrine. See, e.g., 49
C.F.R. § 1103.23 (1994) (stating the practitioner's duties and responsibilities
toward a client before the Interstate Commerce Commission); FED. R. EvD. 501
(stating that except as otherwise required, privilege in federal courts "shall be
governed by the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience"). Courts typi-
cally cite two principle definitions of the privilege. Dean Wigmore phrased the
general principle of the attorney-client privilege as:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 WiGMORE, supra, § 2292 (footnote omitted). Judge Charles E. Wyzanski pro-
vided another frequently cited definition of the privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication
was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a)
by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950). See generally United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666, 670 n.2 (5th Cir.
1975) (collating the leading cases on the general rule of attorney-client privi-
lege); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney.Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978) (tracing the development of the attorney-
client privilege from the seventeenth century through the present).
59. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; accord Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403 (1976); McCoRMicK, supra note 56, § 92 ("[Tjoday it is agreed that the basic
policy of the rule is that of encouraging clients to lay the facts fully before their
counsel."). By providing the attorney and the client with a confidential forum in
which to discuss the client's problems, the privilege allows the attorney to
represent the client more effectively and advance the interests of justice. See
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that the attorney will hold the disclosures in confidence. The
privilege belongs to the client only, not the attorney.60 It pro-
tects communications clients make to attorneys for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice. 61
1. Attorney-Client Privilege in Patent Cases Under the
Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit has described the attorney-client privi-
lege as "a basic, time-honored privilege [warranting] careful con-
sideration."6 2 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provides that principles of federal common law should govern
privileges applied to issues, like those in patent cases, arising
under federal law.63 Originally, American courts did not apply
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (stating that the attorney-client privilege promotes
"broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of jus-
tice"); Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, The Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work-Product Immunity in the Eyes of the Accused Infringer, 15 AIPLA
Q.J. 231, 232 (1987) ("The attorney-client privilege recognizes that sound legal
advice or advocacy serves the public interest and that such advice or advocacy
depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by his or her client.").
60. UNip. R. EvD. 502(b) (1986); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2321.
Lawmakers during the reign of Elizabeth I originally formulated the privilege
to protect the "oath and the honor" of the attorney. Id. § 2290. During the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the belief that a client should be
free from apprehension in consulting his legal advisor gradually replaced that
rationale for the privilege. Id. Therefore, only the client, either personally or
by attorney, may assert the privilege. UmiF. R. EviD. 502(c) (1986). The privi-
lege also applies to corporate clients, despite their impersonal nature. Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 389-90.
61. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403. Unlike attorney
work product, attorney-client communications need not be made in anticipation
of litigation to be protected. See McCoRmcK, supra note 56, § 96. While all
courts apply the privilege to qualifying statements from the client to the attor-
ney, some do not apply it to communications from the attorney to the client;
most courts, however, allow the privilege when an attorney-to-client communi-
cation otherwise meets the general requirements of privilege. See United
States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Legal advice
or opinion from an attorney to his client, individual or corporate, has consist-
ently been held by the federal courts to be within the protection of the attorney-
client privilege.") (citations omitted); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th
Cir. 1968) ("The recognition that privilege extends to statements of a lawyer to
a client is necessary to prevent the use of the lawyer's statements as admissions
of the client."). Courts have also applied the privilege to information communi-
cated by the attorney's agents. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 121 F. Supp. 792,794 (D. Del. 1954) (holding communication privileged, in
part, if person to whom communication was made is member of bar or his im-
mediate subordinate and is acting as a lawyer in connection with the
conmunication).
62. Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
63. FED. R. EvID. 501.
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the privilege to clients in patent litigation because the courts be-
lieved the communications were technical in character and
therefore non-legal. 64  Courts, including the Federal Circuit,
now hold the preparation and prosecution of patent applications
and opinion letters privileged when the communications other-
wise meet the general privilege requirements. 65 For a communi-
cation directed from the attorney to the client, the Federal
Circuit applies the privilege when the communication directly or
indirectly reveals the substance of a confidential communication
by the client.66
2. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is not absolute; clients 67 may
waive the privilege either expressly or impliedly.68 Through
64. See, e.g., Zenith Radio, 121 F. Supp. at 794 (holding that attorney-cli-
ent privilege only applies to patent attorneys when they are "acting as a law-
yer" and that this does not include writing patent applications or even the
general application of patent law to developments at their companies); cf
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 359 (holding that legal advice related
to a fact attained from a patent is not privileged because a patent is a public
document).
65. Sperry v. Florida ex rel Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963) (noting
that a patent constitutes "one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw
with accuracy"). In rebuffing the rationale that legal opinions based on public
documents cannot be privileged, the District Court for the District of Columbia
wrote, "[i]f an attorney-client communication could be discovered if it contained
information known to others, then it would be the rare communication that
would be protected and, in turn, it would be the rare client who would freely
communicate to an attorney." In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D.
377, 390 (D.D.C. 1978); see also In re Natta, 410 F.2d 187, 190-94 (1969) (grant-
ing protection to attorney work product as well as attorney-client communica-
tions), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136, 146-47 (D. Del. 1977) (extending attorney-client privilege to patent
agents working under direct supervision of an attorney); Collins and Aikman
Corp. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 219,220 (D.S.C. 1971) ("Work prod-
uct and attorney-client privileges exist in the field of patent law and must be
respected by the court in regulating discovery.").
66. American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
67. Since the privilege belongs to the client, only the client, or the client's
attorney or agent acting with the client's authority, may waive the privilege.
McCoRMICK, supra note 56, § 93. In a corporation, the corporate management
retains the authority to claim or waive the privilege. Id.
68. Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1125 (1975); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2292. A party effects an
express waiver by an intentional statement or conduct to that effect. See Weil
v. Investment/Indicators, Research and Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("[Voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney com-
munication constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other such communica-
tions on the same subject."). An implied waiver occurs when a party allows
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what is known as "at issue" waiver, a client may waive the privi-
lege by putting a certain communication at issue. For example,
a client can waive the privilege either by disclosing a privileged
communication 69 or by asserting reliance on the advice of coun-
sel in a privileged letter as an essential element of its defense.70
The Federal Circuit finds an "at issue" waiver when: the privi-
leged party puts its confidence at issue through an affirmative
act; the assertion of the privilege results in manifest injustice to
the opposing party; and the information sought is "vital" or "nec-
essary" to the defense.7 '
Once a court decides that a waiver of privilege has occurred,
it must determine the scope of the waiver. Under the doctrine of
subject-matter waiver,72 a client, by waiving the privilege on
certain communications, effects a waiver of the privilege for
other communications related to the same subject matter.7 3
otherwise privileged information to be submitted into evidence or accidentally
discloses privileged information to a non-privileged party. Hercules, 434 F.
Supp. at 156.
69. Waiver in this situation derives from traditional notions of waiver and
holds that by taking an action which places the privileged communication "at
issue," a party may lose the privilege if, to avoid unfair prejudice, truthful reso-
lution of the action requires access to the information by the opposing party.
Allen v. West Point-Pepperell Inc., 848 F. Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See
generally Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 411-16
(D. Del. 1992) (conducting an historical review of implied waiver resulting from
placing attorney-client communications "at issue").
70. The rationale here is similar to that underlying "at issue" waiver when
a party produces a document; since the party has placed its state of mind
(claiming reliance on opinion of counsel) at issue, the opposing party, out of
fairness, should have access to all information which could have helped the first
party form its state of mind. See Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin, No. 91 Civ. 8675, 1994
WL 538124, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1994) (noting that reliance on the advice of
counsel is the most commonly cited example of "at issue" waiver).
71. Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (adopting the test of Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash.
1975)).
72. The doctrine of subject-matter waiver provides that a party loses the
attorney-client privilege by introducing an issue which in fairness requires an
examination of communications otherwise protected by that privilege. Cox v.
United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1419 (11th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied sub nom., United Steelworkers of America v. Cox, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995).
73. See McCormick-Morgan Inc. v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 765 F. Supp. 611,
613-14 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Because evidence of an attorney's advice to a client
would not tend to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more or less probable, it would not be relevant under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 401, which defines relevant evidence as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401; Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Micron
Technology, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D. Del. 1993). When the alleged
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This doctrine is based on the principle that it is unfair to allow a
party to choose among its privileged communications and pro-
duce only those favorable to the party's case. By requiring the
production of all communications related to the same subject-
matter, the court prevents the party from hiding unfavorable ev-
idence and gives the opposing party access to possible rebuttal
evidence. 74
In patent litigation, courts often apply subject-matter
waiver when an accused infringer produces a privileged opinion
letter from counsel. The waiver's scope in this area, however, is
unclear. While some district courts have limited the waiver to
communications directly related to the production of the opinion
letter,7 5 most have extended it to all communications relating to
the subject matter of the letter,76 and some have even extended
it to the attorney work product.77
infringer responds to a claim of wiUfl infringement by asserting a good faith
reliance on advice of counsel, however, then documents and testimony related
to the advice become relevant and admissible because they are probative of the
alleged infringer's state of mind. Id.
74. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Coulter Corp., 118
F.R.D. 532, 533 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("[W]aiver exists because it would be inequita-
ble to have [defendant] present selected communications in its defense, while
withholding from [plaintiff] possibly damaging communications under the guise
of the attorney-client privilege.").
75. See, e.g., Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444,446-47 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (inferring waiver when the defendant asserted good faith reliance on the
advice of counsel).
76. See, e.g., Macrovision Corp. v. VSA Ltd., 1989 WL 112808, at *1 (D. Or.
Sept. 20, 1989) ("The voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney
communication waives the privilege as to all other attorney communications on
the same subject."); Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977, 979-
80 (D. Del. 1982) (requiring production of all the documents relating to infringe-
ment), aff'd, 758 F.2d 668 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985);
Nye v. Sage Prods., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 452,453 (N.D. IM. 1982) ("Production of some
privileged documents waives privilege as to all documents of the same subject
matter.").
77. See, e.g., Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("By asserting the advice of
counsel defense, the defendants have waived their attorney work product im-
munity."); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 581 F. Supp. 51,54 (W.D.
Okla. 1982) (stating that the waiver included all the documents related to the
patent claim covered by attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine).
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C. KlosTER AND FROMSON: ESTABLISHING THE NEGATiVE
INFERENCE
The Federal Circuit, in Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible,
Inc.78 and Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co.,7 9
narrowed the attorney-client privilege in patent litigation. In
both cases, the court held that where the infringer did not pro-
duce an exculpating opinion of counsel, the district court could
infer the infringer either did not obtain an opinion or obtained
an unfavorable opinion.80
In Kloster, the plaintiff and accused infringer, Stora Kop-
parbergs Bergslags AB ("Stora"), attempted to defeat a finding of
willfulness by relying on a memorandum from its chief technical
expert. The expert prepared the memorandum after the charge
of infringement but before Stora commenced its infringement in
the United States.8 ' The memorandum stated that Stora would
presume that the patent was valid until it could conduct an eval-
uation of the patent's validity and concluded that if the patent
was valid, Stora's product infringed the patent.8 2 The Federal
Circuit affirmed a finding that Stora proceeded with the in-
fringement on the assumption, as stated in the memorandum,
that the patents were valid and infringed.8 3 The court con-
cluded, without citing precedent, and with no reference to the
attorney-client privilege that, "Stora's silence on the subject, in
alleged reliance on the attorney-client privilege, would warrant
the conclusion that it either obtained no advice of counsel or did
78. 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub noam., Stora Kop-
parbergs Bergslags AB v. Crucible, Inc., 479 U.S. 1034 (1987).
79. 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 907 (1991).
80. Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1580; Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572-73.
81. Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1577. Stora, though the accused infringer, was also
the plaintiff because it filed a declaratory judgment action after being charged
with infringement of the defendant's patent on a high-speed tool steel. Id. at
1569-70.
82. Id. at 1577. A part of the memorandum excerpted by the court read:
Crucible [the defendant] maintains that additional patent claims,
based on an old patent application, have now been approved in the
USA and that these patent claims are so worded that we are infringing
on them by selling ASP-steel in the USA. We have for now no possibili-
ties for checking this, but must proceed [on the assumption] that it is
true. A new search for prior art has been started and the material that
has come to hand will be evaluated at the latest by April 15th. If
enough solid prior art are found by them, we can bring an action
against Crucible and begin to sell ASP-steel in the USA. If the new
patent claims, on the other hand, should be judged to be valid, we will
be closed out of the American market for the foreseeable future.
Id.
83. Id.
1995]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
so and was advised that its importation and sale of the accused
products would be an infringement of valid U.S. patents."8 4
Two years later, in Fromson, the defendant refused to
answer interrogatories on whether it obtained counsel's opinion
before it began the infringing activity until it was found liable
for infringement at trial.8 5 The Federal Circuit, again without
referring to the attorney-client privilege, concluded that the dis-
trict court could make a negative inference based on the defend-
ant's assertion of the attorney-client privilege.8 6 Again, the
court failed to cite authority for its conclusion apart from its ear-
lier decision in Kloster.8 7
II. CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
INFERENCE
A. EFFECTS OF THE NEGATIVE INFERENCE ON ACCUSED
INFRINGERS AND THE PATENT BAR
While the inference sanctioned by the Federal Circuit in
Fromson and Kloster has some logic, 8 the Federal Circuit
adopted the inference without discussing its rationale.8 9 The
court's approach differs considerably from that of other courts
considering the issue in similar situations. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently refused to ap-
84. Id. at 1580.
85. Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572.
86. Id. at 1572-73. The court stated: "Where the infringer fails to intro-
duce an exculpatory opinion of counsel at trial, a court must be free to infer that
either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was contrary
to the infringer's desire to initiate or continue its use of the patentee's inven-
tion." Id.; see PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 10:7 (1993) ("In addition, it sanctioned this negative inference without ad-
dressing the issue of whether it would be perceived by potential clients as mak-
ing the act of consulting with an attorney a risk, and therefore be inconsistent
with the privilege's rationale of encouraging clients to freely consult with
attorneys.").
87. Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572.
88. The inference bears a resemblance to the "Missing witness" rules,
whereby the unexplained failure to call an available witness who possesses
knowledge about a material issue and is within the control of a party permits
an inference that the witness' testimony would have been adverse to that party.
See RICE, supra note 86, § 10:7 (discussing negative inferences arising from an
assertion of privilege). Opinion letters in a patent infingement suit, however,
differ from statements of a general witness which are seldom protected by a
privilege. In addition, courts have historically exercised considerable restraint
before applying the "missing witness" rules. Id.
89. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (noting the lack of sup-
port in the court's decision).
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ply a negative inference from the exercise of the privilege in a
contract action.90
Federal district courts have also refused to apply the nega-
tive inference in patent cases. For example, the District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio refused to apply a negative in-
ference when a defendant had obtained two opinion letters, but
would not disclose one of them, relying on the attorney-client
privilege.9 ' The court stated that "[the defendant's] failure to
offer the opinion cannot be used to infer willfulness since that
would undermine the purpose of the privilege."92 Likewise, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, in a case
pre-dating both Kioster and Fromson, reached the same result.9 3
Because a negative inference would threaten the attorney-client
privilege, the court refused to draw an inference when the ac-
90. Parker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 900 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir.
1990). The parties in Parker disputed whether the plaintiff's acceptance of an
insurance policy refund constituted an accord and satisfaction that would block
any further action on the policy. Id. at 775. Plaintiffs state of mind was thus
an important element of the case. When asked to testify about the advice he
had given his client, the plaintiffs former attorney asserted the attorney-client
privilege. Id. The trial court upheld the assertion of the privilege, but drew the
inference that the attorney had advised the client that accepting the check
would constitute an accord and satisfaction, and granted a directed verdict for
the defendant. Id. The appellate court rejected the inference because it was
inconsistent with the privilege. Id. The court stated:
Thornton's testimony relates to [the plaintiff's] state of mind when she
deposited the check from Prudential. However, the testimony is only
probative if one infers that the attorney told her acceptance of the
check either would or would not waive further claims for the policy
benefits. Any such inference would intrude upon the protected realm
of the attorney-client privilege. The privilege was created to protect
the right to effective counsel. "[Ain individual in a free society should
be encouraged to consult with his attorney whose function is to counsel
and advise him and he should be free from apprehension of compelled
disclosures by his legal advisor." To protect that interest, a client
asserting the privilege should not face a negative inference about the
substance of the information sought.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted). British courts have also protected the at-
torney-client privilege from negative inferences for many years:
The exclusion of such evidence is for the general interest of the commu-
nity, and therefore to say that when a party refuses to permit profes-
sional confidence to be broken, everything must be taken most strongly
against him, what is it but to deny him the protection which, for public
purposes, the law affords him, and utterly to take away a privilege
which can thus only be asserted to his prejudice.
Wentworth v. Lloyd, 1862-1864 Rev. Rep. 315, 316-17 (1864).
91. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1628,
1631 n.11 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
92. Id.
93. A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal dis-
missed, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
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cused infringer's attorney would not produce relevant docu-
ments in a patent infringement case.94
B. THE INFERENCE SHIFTs THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE
ACCUSED INFRINGER WITHOUT A LOGICAL BASIs
Not only did the Federal Circuit fail to consider the effect of
the inference on the attorney-client privilege, it also did not ad-
dress the probable shift in burdens of proof between the paten-
tee and the accused infringer caused by the inference. The
inference, when combined with the court's earlier imposition on
the accused infringer of a duty of due care,95 effectively elimi-
nates the burden on the patentee to prove willfulness, and
places a corresponding burden on the accused infringer to ex-
plain its actions in almost all circumstances. 96 The Federal Cir-
cuit technically requires the patentee to prove willfulness by
clear and convincing evidence.97 Under the ioster and From-
son standard, however, a patentee need only prove that the
infringer knows about the patent and has not produced an excul-
patory opinion at trial.98 The negative inference, in effect, pro-
94. Id. The court stated:
It is clear that the assertion of the claim of privilege can give rise to no
adverse inferences. This is so, irrespective of the nature of the pro-
ceeding in which the claim is made, since every conscientious lawyer is
duty-bound to raise the claim in any proceedings in order to protect
communications made in confidence.... The attorney-client privilege
has long been recognized as essential to proper administration of jus-
tice.... I am, frankly, hesitant to do anything which would contribute
to the undermining of the protection afforded by the time-honored rule
which excludes from evidence such confidential communications.
Id. at 101-02 (citation omitted).
95. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (describing the afBxma-
tive duty of due care the court places on an accused infringer under Underwater
Devices).
96. One commentator notes that "[a]ifter Underwater, a patent owner did
not have to prove the bad faith state of mind of the infringer. It only had to
prove that the infringer (1) knew of the patent and (2) its relation to infringer's
activities, and (3) thereafter commenced infringing acts or continued them."
Stanley L. Amberg, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Asserting a Good-
Faith State of Mind Defense, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'y 271, 273
(1991).
97. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d
1430, 1440 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988). See supra note 23 and
accompanying text (describing the required quantum of proof for a finding of
willful infringement).
98. Amberg, supra note 96, at 273; see also Cox, supra note 39, at 595
('Even though lip service is paid to the requirement that willful infringement
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the alleged infringer who seeks to
avail himself of the attorney/client privilege is faced with a deck stacked
against him.").
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vides the rest of the patentee's prima facie case for the issue of
willful infringement. 99
This low burden of proof on the patentee forces a cautious
patent attorney, when drafting an opinion letter, to assume the
worst and expect an eventual waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege.100 Patent attorneys now write opinions with an eye toward
the jury rather than toward giving the client good advice. 10 1 As
a result, the client may not receive a candid, evenhanded assess-
ment of its position despite the great expense of the letter. The
negative inference thus abrogates the goal of the attorney-client
privilege of fostering communication between the attorney and
the client.10 2
If a defendant's failure to produce an opinion of counsel in-
variably leads to the conclusion that the defendant is trying to
hide an unfavorable opinion, the negative inference might be
justified. The Federal Circuit, however, overlooked the fact that
an infringer may have legitimate reasons for choosing not to dis-
close its opinion letter. The accused infringer may not wish to
produce the letter because it contains statements describing the
party's litigation or business strategy.' 03 Additionally, the ac-
cused infringer may not care to explain to the jury legal theories
99. Cox, supra note 39, at 595.
100. Donald R. Dunner & Richard L. Rainey, Opinions of Counsel, Privilege
in Patent Litigation and Prejudice from Claiming Privilege, in PATENT LEiTGA-
TION 1993, at 285, 298 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. G-376, 1993) (recommending that patent
attorneys "should assume that whatever opinion is generated will more proba-
bly than not have to be produced to the opposing party").
101. RICE, supra note 86, § 10:7 ("At the very minimum, the inferences will
likely encourage clients to obtain 'showpiece' written opinions for potential liti-
gation purposes and more candid opinions through some means ... that cannot
easily be discovered."); Racine & Bosch, supra note 1, at 420 (stating that cli-
ents obtain opinions from counsel more for protection than as an effort to avoid
infringement of a patent). The inference also interferes with the patent attor-
ney's ethical obligation to give frank advice to his client. See MODEL R. PROF.
CoNDucT 2.1 (1992) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independ-
ent professional judgment and render candid advice.").
102. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (addressing the
scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context); Cox, supra note
39, at 589 (warning that the inference encourages the "drafting of opinion
letters which do not honestly reflect the attorneys [sic] thoughts and advice").
103. For instance, the opinion letter may state specific reasons given by
counsel for advising the accused infringer that the plaintiffs patent is either
invalid or not infringed. See Dunner & Rainey, supra note 100, at 287 ("If, on
the one hand, the accused infringer produces the opinion to his adversary, he
provides his opponent with what could be... a veritable road map to his theo-
ries of the case, not to mention admissions which will be played back to the fact
finder like a fine violin.").
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in the opinion letter that differ from those of the current trial
strategy. 10 4 Moreover, a client may often want its patent attor-
ney of long standing to represent it at trial. If the attorney who
wrote the opinion letter also represents the accused infringer at
trial, the patentee may call the attorney as a witness, forcing the
attorney's removal from the case.10 5
The Federal Circuit has provided no clear guidance on what
situations warrant a negative inference. Because the inquiry is
fact-based and dependent on a totality of the circumstances,
anomalous results invariably ensue, forcing patent attorneys to
practice as though a district court will apply the inference in any
given case.106 The Federal Circuit also reviews willfulness de-
terminations under a "clearly erroneous" standard, exacerbating
the problem by affirming many marginal cases and leaving
observers to wonder whether the court will apply the same
analysis to similar factual situations in the future.107
A privilege which is uncertain or results in widely varying
application by the courts is little better than no privilege at
all.1 08 Though district courts have not always applied the infer-
ence, it hangs over the practicing patent attorney and presents
an unfair dilemma for the accused infringer.10 9
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., Amsted Indus. Inc. v. National Castings, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
1737, 1741 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (requiring oral testimony from the attorney who
wrote the opinion to determine whether the client withheld material informa-
tion). The attorney has an ethical obligation to withdraw as trial counsel if
called as a witness for his own client, "except where: (1) [t]he testimony relates
to an uncontested issue; (2) [t]he testimony relates to the nature and value of
legal services rendered in the case; or (3) [d]isqualification of the lawyer would
work substantial hardship on the client." MODEL R. PROF. CoNDucT 3.7 (1989).
106. Donald S. Chisum, Patent Law and the Presumption of Moral Regular-
ity: A Critical Review of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on Inequitable Con-
duct and Willful Infringement, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soo'y 27, 45
(1987).
107. See, e.g., Pavlak, supra note 26, § 3.04 ("For every decision that says a
particular fact or circumstance is a basis for willful infringement, there is an-
other decision which disregards or rejects that same fact or circumstance.");
Garland P. Andrews, Willful Infringement of Patents, in PATENT LAW ANNUAL
§ 8.02[2] (1988) (stating that the Federal Circuit's willfulness doctrine creates
confusion by basing findings on a clearly erroneous standard of review and a
"totality of the circumstances" finding of fact).
108. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (ac-
knowledging that the privilege may only be effective where the parties are free
from the apprehension of disclosure).
109. Robert L. Baechtold, The Federal Circuit's Views on Attorney Client
Privilege, Work Product and Related Items, 29 IDEA 233, 239 (1989) ("[I]f the
Court draws the worst possible inference from the exercise of [the attorney-
client privilege], the privilege becomes meaningless.").
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C. THE INFERENCE HAS LITTLE PRAcTIcAL EFFECT
The inference of ioster and Fromson has had little effect on
the final disposition of any particular kind of case. Whether the
defendant presents an opinion of counsel or not, some cases
clearly do not involve willful infringement. In other cases, the
infringer's egregious conduct, or other evidence of bad faith,
compels a finding of willfulness regardless of the existence of an
opinion letter. The most difficult cases fall in the middle, where
the numerous factors of the "totality of the circumstances" test
point in different directions.
The court seldom considers whether the infringer obtained
an opinion of counsel in cases where the non-opinion factors
clearly indicate the infringement was not willful. 110 Where the
infringement is clearly willful, the court need not concern itself
with the presence or absence of an opinion letter. Because the
external factors weigh so heavily against the infringer, an excul-
patory opinion is of little help; the existence of an opinion letter
is simply irrelevant to the court.
Where the courts do apply the inference, it serves to
increase the magnitude of an already large amount of evidence,
merely soothing the court's fear that it did not adequately sup-
port its decision.111 Courts and juries have such broad discre-
tion in finding willfulness and awarding increased damages that
most cases reflect a "gut feeling" reaction to the accused
infringer's conduct.1 1 2 The factfinder's overall reaction to the
110. In Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Production Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410
(Fed. Cir. 1993), for example, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court which
set aside a jury's willfulness finding. Id. at 415. The district court found that
the record showed no evidence of copying, that Baker in good faith concluded
that its device did not infringe, and that Baker mounted a substantial challenge
to the infringement charge. Id. at 414. The Federal Circuit noted, "[allthough
Baker did not obtain an opinion of counsel about the likelihood of infringement,
the district court... correctly noted that failure to obtain legal advice does not
mandate a finding of willfulness or bad faith." Id.
111. For example, in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117,
1126-27 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993), the defendant admitted
that it copied the athletic shoe patented by the plaintiff, explaining that copying
is prevalent in the fashion industry. The court noted that under Kloster, the
defendant's failure to produce an opinion letter could support the drawing of an
adverse inference. Id. at 1126. The court's willfulness finding, however, was
based on factor's other than the absence of the opinion letter. The court stated,
"[defendant's] deliberate copying was strong evidence of willful infringement,
without any exculpatory evidence to balance the weight." Id. at 1127.
112. See Chisum, supra note 106, at 41 (arguing that the "totality of the
circumstances" standard exerts a destabilizing effect on patent disputes and
causes parties to take unreasonable positions).
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infringer's entire pattern of conduct, both before and during the
litigation, typically determines the outcome of the willfulness is-
sue.113 The Federal Circuit's standard that willfulness findings
should be based on the totality of the circumstances blurs each
of the factors making up the totality of the circumstances, forc-
ing the factfinder to reconstruct the accused infringer's intent
from a mass of evidence.
The "borderline" cases create the most difficulty and are
likely candidates for an application of the ioster inference. The
inference provides a convenient tie-breaker when the evidence
does not clearly suggest the defendant's bad faith. The patentee
will seldom meet its burden of proving willfulness by clear and
convincing evidence and will rely upon a negative inference to
tilt the balance toward a finding of willfulness. In these cases
courts again should not apply the inference. The Federal Circuit
has enumerated almost a dozen factors aside from opinion
letters to guide willfulness determinations. 114 If the patent
holder cannot establish a clear and convincing case of willful in-
fringement with these available factors, an opinion letter
drafted by counsel friendly to the infringer will be of little
help.115
D. BIFURCATION: THE FEDERAL CmCUIT's PROPOSED SOLUTION
The Federal Circuit appears to be moving away from a
strict, broad-based application of the inference-perhaps recog-
nizing the damaging effect the negative inference has had on ac-
cused infringers and the weakness of the inference. In one case
where the accused infringer did not present an opinion of coun-
sel, the court stated, "there is no per se rule that an opinion let-
113. Pavlak, supra note 26, § 3.04.
114. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text (describing the non-
opinion factors in the "totality of the circumstances" test for willful
infringement).
115. For example, in Pall Corp. v. Micron Separation, Inc., 792 F. Supp.
1298 (D. Mass. 1992), the district court noted that because Micron, the accused
infinger, made extensive use of Pall's patent and did not obtain an opinion let-
ter, increased damages appeared appropriate. Id. at 1331. Nevertheless, the
court did not find the infringement willful. Id. The court noted that the failure
to consult counsel was "not terribly troublesome" because Micron's employees
were experienced in the industry and made significant efforts to avoid the
claims of the patent. Id. With factors indicating both willful and nonwiliful
infringement, the court considered the presence or absence of an opinion letter
irrelevant where Pall was required to show that the "infringer had no reason-
able basis for believing it had a right to [participate in the infringing acts]." Id.
(quoting Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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ter from patent counsel will necessarily preclude a finding of
willful infringement,... nor is there aper se rule that the lack of
such a letter necessarily requires a finding of willfulness." 116 In
a recent case, the Federal Circuit agreed that a district court
properly drew a negative inference from the accused infringer's
refusal to produce an opinion of counsel. 117 The circuit court,
nevertheless, held that the defendant's assertion of the privilege
did not raise an irrebuttable presumption of willfulness, reason-
ing that such a rule would not accommodate the consideration of
other facts, nor respect the right to assert the attorney-client
privilege. 118
The Federal Circuit recently tried to solve the problems
caused by the negative inference by urging the district courts to
bifurcate patent trials. The court stated that trial courts should
not, without careful consideration, force an accused infringer to
choose between waiving the privilege to protect itself from a
willfulness finding, and maintaining the privilege, in which case
it risks being found a willful infringer by the inference. 119 The
court recommended that trial courts give "serious consideration"
to separate trials on liability and willfulness. 120
The patent bar has warmly received the court's suggestion,
because it eliminates several of the problems created by the in-
ference.1 21 The accused infringer is not required to produce the
opinion letter until after it has been found liable for infringe-
116. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
117. Electro Medical Sys., S-.A v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048,
1057 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
118. Id. The court stated, "there are no hard and fast rules in respect to
willfullness," and found the content of the opinion letter irrelevant, deciding
that the defendant only infringed the patent to establish a controversy so that it
could bring a declaratory judgment action. Id. at 1056-57. The court appar-
ently believed such an act exhibited good faith.
119. Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
120. Id. at 644.
121. The ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law agrees that the issue of
willfulness should be bifurcated in jury trials:
RESOLVED, that the Section of Intellectual Property Law supports in
principle the proposition that an accused patent infringer should not
be required to disclose its attorneys' opinions to a jury or offer other
evidence before a jury in defense to a charge of willfulness before it has
been found liable for infringement; and Specifically, the Section favors
the adoption, either by the courts or by legislation, of a rule that in all
patent cases tried to a jury, trial of willfulness should be deferred until
after liability for infringement is established.
1993-94 A.B.A. SEc. INT. Pop. L. ANN. REP. 362. By delaying the introduction
of the opinion letter until a later trial, bifurcation eliminates the danger that
the accused infringer will be prejudiced because its defenses in the opinion
letter differ from those at trial. See Andrews, supra note 107, § 8.03[3] ("The
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ment, so it need not worry about divulging its plans to either
opposing counsel or the jury during the liability portion of the
trial. Patent attorneys may, therefore, feel more comfortable
writing opinion letters that reflect their real views about the ac-
cused infringer's potential liability. As a result, their clients
should receive more valuable, candid advice about legal options.
The district courts, however, have not readily followed the
Federal Circuit's suggestion. While some courts have granted
motions for bifurcation,122 many others have denied motions,
citing judicial economy. 123 The true weight of the ioster infer-
ence falls on those defendants whose motions for bifurcation are
denied.
Considering the wide discretion granted trial courts when
deciding the issue of bifurcation,' 24 few district courts will likely
change their practices based on the Federal Circuit's suggestion
alternate safe approach for the accused infringer is to bifurcate the issue of
willfulness ... from the liability issues.").
122. See, e.g., Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. v. General Instrument Corp., 24 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d 1239, 1241 (D. Md. 1993) (granting bifurcation of willfulness with-
out mentioning Fromson or Quantum); Air-Shields, Inc. v. BOC Group, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955, 1957-58 (D. Md. 1992) (granting bifurcation of liability
from damages and willfulness but refusing to stay damages discovery); Amsted
Indus. Inc. v. National Castings Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (granting bifurcation when willfulness was an issue); Mag Instrument,
Inc. v. J. Baxter Brinkmann Intl Corp., 123 F.R.D. 543, 545-47 (N.D. TeL
1988) (granting separate trials on liability and damages, but not on the issue of
inequitable conduct and rejecting the plaintiff's argument that bifurcation
would violate its seventh amendment right to a jury trial).
123. See, e.g., IPPV Enter. v. Cable/Home Comm. Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1714, 1717 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (denying bifurcation); Spectra-Physics La-
sers, Inc. v. Uniphase Corp., 144 F.R.D. 99, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (refusing bifur-
cation and rejecting the defendant's assertion that bifurcation was necessary to
avoid intrusion into the attorney-client privilege); Blumenthal v. Barber-Col-
man Holdings Corp., No. 90-C-20365, 1991 WL 352523, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3,
1991) (denying bifurcation and refusing to stay discovery); Keyes Fibre Co. v.
Packaging Corp. of Am., 763 F. Supp. 374, 376 (N.D. IlI. 1991) (holding that the
damage issue was not so complex as to warrant separate trials and that bifurca-
tion was not necessary to avoid prejudice since the case would be tried by the
court sitting without a jury); THK America, Inc. v. Nippon Seiko KIK., 141
F.R.D. 463, 465 (N.D. M11. 1991) (denying bifurcation and asserting that the jury
must decide both liability and willfulness). The expense and effort required for
a patent damages determination is exemplified by Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. Mass. 1990). In Polaroid, the liabil-
ity portion of the case was decided in 1985, while the damages case was not
decided until five years later. See id.
124. Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant
part: "The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a sepa-
rate trial.., of any separate issue.., or issues." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (empha-
sis added). The district court in Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. James River Corp.,
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to bifurcate. While the Federal Circuit could use its role as the
reviewing court for all patent appeals to order the district courts
to bifurcate liability and damage issues in all patent cases,1 25
this would waste judicial resources in cases where there is little
reason to bifurcate. Such a course is unlikely in light of the
court's earlier faint-hearted suggestion that courts bifurcate
patent trials. Similarly, Congress is unlikely to require bifurca-
tion since a blanket requirement would increase the load on al-
ready-strained judicial resources.
M. FREEING THE ACCUSED INFRINGER OF ITS
DILEMMA
Although the Federal Circuit's negative inference has little
real effect in the courtroom, it has had a great effect on the way
accused infringers interact with patent counsel. The Federal
Circuit should limit the language of ioster to cases in which an
inference is logical: where the district court is willing to grant a
motion for bifurcation. Under this logic, non-bifurcated trials
would return to a standard where the patentee must carry the
full burden of proving willful infringement by clear and convinc-
ing evidence without any help from the court. The accused
infringer would have the option of introducing its opinion letter
to refute evidence of willful infringement. Introduction of the
letter would waive the attorney-client privilege for all communi-
cation related to similar subject matter; however, the waiver
would be voluntary. Alternatively, the accused infringer could
assert the attorney-client privilege and keep all opinions out of
the trial. As a result, the patentee and the accused infringer
would have to establish or rebut willfulness using the various
131 F.R.D. 607, 608-09 (N.D. Ga. 1989), listed the following considerations for a
decision to bifurcate:
In addition to the more general factors set forth in Rule 42(b); i.e. (1)
convenience; (2) prejudice; (3) expedition; and (4) economy; a court re-
viewing a motion for separate trials may properly consider (5) whether
the issues sought to be tried separately are significantly different; (6)
whether they are triable by jury or the court; (7) whether discovery has
been directed to a single trial of all issues; (8) whether the evidence
required for each issue is substantially different; (9) whether one party
would gain some unfair advantage from separate trials; (10) whether a
single trial of all issues would create the potential for jury bias or con-
fusion; and (11) whether bifurcation would enhance or reduce the pos-
sibility of a pretrial settlement.
125. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit over patent litigation).
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factors aside from opinion letters in the "totality of the circum-
stances" test.
126
This solution still presents the accused infringer with a di-
lemma;127 unlike the dilemma caused by the Federal Circuit's
inference, however, this dilemma is fair to both parties. Privi-
leges protect only communications, not the underlying facts
themselves; the patentee, therefore, still has access to all non-
privileged data to establish the accused infringer's bad faith.128
The accused infringer must make a difficult choice, but no rule
can remove all difficult choices from litigation. The non-opinion
letter factors should clearly establish nonwillfulness for the
infringer if it exercised due care. If the non-opinion factors are
not clear, however, the infringer must make a choice between
asserting the privilege or producing the opinion letter, but at
least the threat of an adverse inference is not forcing its hand.
Removing the inference in unbifurcated trials should also
encourage more district courts to give "serious consideration" to
separate trials for liability and willfulness. 129 The accused
infringer will desire bifurcation to keep evidence of its willful
infringement out of the liability portion of the trial. In addition,
the patentee will lobby the trial court to bifurcate so that it can
gain access to the opinion letter or receive the benefit of the neg-
ative inference during the willfulness trial.
Patentees may argue that this approach would hurt them
when the evidence is close and the withheld opinion letter is
unfavorable. An unscrupulous infringer presenting a convincing
case at trial may obtain relief from liability by sitting on an
unfavorable opinion letter and depriving the patentee of a fair
trial. Such a scenario is unlikely. Where a well represented pat-
entee cannot establish copying or clear infringement at trial, an
126. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text (describing factors aside
from opinion letters in the "totality of the circumstances" test).
127. If the defendant relies on a favorable opinion letter, the court will force
it to produce all other documents related to the same subject matter. See supra
notes 72-77 and accompanying text (describing subject matter waiver). The de-
fendant, by holding on to the letter, may be unable to rebut the patent holder's
prima fade case of willfulness based on other factors in the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test.
128. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 309
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that the policy supporting the attorney-client privilege
is defensible because the system offers so many devices for discovering the facts
and exposing the evidence).
129. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing the Federal Cir-
cuit's recommendation that trial courts give "serious consideration" to
bifurcation).
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opinion letter written by counsel hired by the infringer is un-
likely to further the patentee's case. Rather, where the issue of
infringement is close, patent counsel who fears the negative in-
ference will have little problem establishing a credible invalid-
ity/non-infringement claim in the opinion letter.
The slight prejudice from the rare case where an infringer is
allowed to hide an unfavorable opinion behind other favorable
factors does not warrant the Federal Circuit's intrusion on the
attorney-client privilege.' 30 Negative inferences are not based
on the bare fact that a party withholds a piece of evidence, but
on nonproduction when it would be natural for the party to pro-
duce the evidence if it had been favorable.131 When a party
relies on a sustainable attorney-client privilege, however, courts
should not draw a negative inference from nonproduction of the
evidence. 132 By eliminating the threat of the negative inference,
the Federal Circuit can remove a major uncertainty for parties
involved in patent litigation and thereby open communications
between the parties and their attorneys. 133
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's inference has scared patent practi-
tioners into writing lily-white opinion letters for their clients,
while giving real advice behind closed doors. As a result, attor-
neys face an ethical quandary and clients do not receive the
quality, impartial legal advice they pay for.
Any beneficial effect of the inference in practice is question-
able at best. The patentholder must establish willfulness by
clear and convincing evidence, and the courts typically apply the
inference only after the patentholder introduces substantial evi-
dence that the accused infringer willfully infringed the patent.
The inference, in effect, serves only to allay the court's fear that
it has not conclusively established the infringer's liability by
allowing the court to pile on more evidence against the accused
infringer.
When combined with its deleterious effect on attorney-client
communications, the inference's minimal effect at trial compels
130. McCormick, referring to negative inferences from assertion of the attor-
ney-client privilege, submits, "[t]he best solution is to recognize only privileges
which are soundly based in policy and to accord those privileges the fullest pro-
tection." McCoRmIci, supra note 56, § 47.1 (emphasis added).
131. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 286.
132. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 2322.
133. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litiga-
tor, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1605, 1615-16 (1986).
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its elimination in certain situations. If the trial court refuses to
bifurcate the trial, thereby eliminating many of the inequities
caused by the inference, the factfinder should be unable to apply
the inference. If the trial court agrees to bifurcate, the applica-
tion of an inference makes sense, and the court will be free to
apply it. Accused infringers can thus be confident that judges
and juries will not be able to consider their opinion letters dur-
ing the determination of liability, and patent attorneys can draft
opinion letters that better advise their clients.
